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Practices-Consumer Protection Act and
the Texas Property Code
Joseph G. Chumlea* and Michael Curry**
I. Introduction
Sixteen years ago the Texas legislature created
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act ("the DTPA"). 1 The DTPA, also
referred to as Texas' mini-F.T.C. Act, is broad in
its scope and application. Like many of the consumer protection laws enacted at the time, it
provides remedies for fraud and deception in
the marketplace through the Texas Attorney
General's Office.2 The DTPA also embodies the
most effective tool for day-to-day consumer
protection, namely private causes of action for
consumers who are damaged due to another's
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, unconscionable conduct, or unfair insurance practice.3 The first part of this article describes the
relief afforded Texas consumers under the DTPA
and analyzes the 1989 amendments to the DTPA
4
which became effective September 1, 1989.
In Texas, as in most states, the law has long
recognized implied warranties of habitability
and good construction which accompany the
sale of a new home.' These warranties are
breached upon proof that the home was not
built in a good and skilled manner or that it is not
suitable for habitation. 6 In such instances, an
aggrieved homebuyer is entitled to recover his
or her actual damages that resulted from the
breach. In Texas, the rights and remedies of the
homebuyer and the homebuilder were dramatically altered by recent amendments to the Texas

Property Code which became effective September 1, 1989. The second part of this article
describes these amendments and
their primary
7
areas of impact on consumers.
II. The Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesConsumer Protection Act
The DTPA creates a private cause of action for
any consumer who has been damaged by another person's proscribed conduct. Some of the
requirements and limitations of bringing a lawsuit under the DTPA fall into the following categories: standing, pre-suit notice, unlawful conduct, prospective defendants, causation, and
damages. These requirements and limitations
are discussed below.
Standing. A "consumer" is defined as any
individual, partnership, corporation, or the State
of Texas, its subdivisions and agencies, who
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease any goods
or services. An individual, partnership or corporation that has assets of $25 million or more (or is
(continued on page 92)
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owned or controlled by a corporation or entity
with assets of $25 million or more) and who
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease goods or
services for commercial or business use are
excluded from this definition. 8 The DTPA declares that waivers by consumers of the provisions of the act are contrary to public policy and
unenforceable9 However, the 1989 amendments
to the DTPA carve out an exception to the prohibition against waivers which allows waivers for
certain large transactions. This exception is addressed in Section III, infra.
Pre-Suit Notice. Prior to filing suit aconsumer
must give the defendant notice of the complaint
and an accounting of damages and attorney fees
incurred. 10 Prior to the 1989 amendments, this
notice had to include the consumer's specific
complaint and be delivered at least thirty days
before the suit was filed. In addition, if the limitations period would have expired within the
thirty-day pre-suit notice period, then the notice need not be sent to the defendant prior to
filing suit.
A defendant may tender settlement after
receipt of the notice and possibly avoid exposure to the treble damages aspect of the DTPA.
The DTPA also provides that if the defendant
tenders asettlement which isrejected, and if the
court subsequently finds that the amount of the
rejected offer is substantially the same as the
actual damages found by the trier of fact, then
the consumer may recover either the amount of
the rejected offer, or the actual damages, whichever is less.
Unlawful Conduct. There are four causes of
action available to a consumer under the DTPA.
These include: (1) a violation of the so-called
"laundry list" of misconduct set forth in Section
17.46 of the DTPA; (2) a breach of an express or
implied warranty; (3)an unconscionable action
or course of action; and (4)a violation of Article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code (dealing with
unfair and misleading practices in the business
of insurance), or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Texas State Board of Insurance.11
The list of misconduct set forth in section 17.46
prohibits twenty-four specific acts, including
misconduct that causes confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship or approval of goods or services. Section 17.46 also
prohibits misrepresentations concerning the
characteristics, uses, benefits, or quantities of
goods or services in question, as well as misrepresentations concerning the rights, remedies
or obligations involved in the agreement between the buyer and the seller.

"Unconscionable action" is specifically defined as that action which takes advantage of the
lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree, or
which results in a gross disparity between the
value received and the consideration12paid by a
consumer in a particular transaction.
Prospective Defendants. Any "person" who
engages in one of the four types of prohibited
conduct described above is subject to being
sued under the DTPA. 13 The term "person" is
broadly defined to include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
group, however organized.14 Privity with the
plaintiff is not necessary in order for the defendant to be subject to liability.15 Thus, once a
plaintiff fits the definition of a "consumer"
under the DTPA (see Standing, supra), he or she
can sue any "person" who engages in prohibited conduct
which causes damage to the
16
plaintiff.

Causation. Producing cause, or cause in fact, is
the causation standard for suits under the
DTPA. 17 This standard is less strict than the proximate cause standard. Under the producing
cause standard, there is no requirement that the
consequence of the actor's conduct be foreseeable, as required under the proximate cause
standard. So long as the conduct was a producing cause of the damages, liability will attach to
the defendant.
Damages. A successful consumer isentitled to
recover his or her "actual damages." In addition, there is a mandatory doubling of the first
$1,000 in damages and the trier of fact may, in its
discretion, award up to three times the amount
of damages in excess of $1,000 if the conduct is
found to have been knowingly committed.18 As
originally passed, the DTPA required that all
damages be trebled. Today, the jury isallowed to
set the amount of exemplary, or punitive, damages, so long as the total damages do not exceed
three times the amount of actual damages. In
addition to recovering actual damages, a successful consumer may be entitled to an injunction, restitution in the form of a court order, or
any other relief which the court deems proper.
Such relief may include the appointment of a
receiver where a judgment remains unsatisfied
for more than three months.1 9
Because it applies to all transactions involving
the sale of goods and services, the DTPA has had
a substantial impact on litigation in Texas. The
DTPA has been applied not only to the sale of
goods and services, but also to the sale of goods
and services in a commercial context, for exam-

pie, between a manufacturer and a retailer. The
DTPA also applies to professional services such
as those provided by lawyers, engineers, and
architects. DTPA litigation has become commonplace in the consumer, commercial, and
personal injury fields.
Perhaps as a consequence of its broad application, the DTPA has been amended by every legislative session since its original enactment in
1973. The 1989 session proved to be no exception when companion bills were introduced in
both the Texas House of Representatives and
Senate. As introduced, these bills sought to
make major revisions to the DTPA and, if passed
as written, would have eliminated many of the
procedural and substantive protection afforded
to Texas consumers. Despite well-organized lobbying by business and professional interest
groups, the bill which ultimately passed affected
only two procedural issues and two limited substantive issues under the DTPA.
III. The 1989 Amendments to the DTPA
Pre-Suit Notice. A consumer must now give a
defendant written notice of the lawsuit at least
sixty days before the suit is filed. The amendments provide that during this sixty-day period,
the defendant isallowed to request a reasonable
inspection of the goods or services in question at
a reasonable time and place. 20 Refusing to allow
this inspection results in a forfeiture of the mandatory doubling of the first $1,000 of any damages ultimately awarded to the consumer. (See
Damages, supra.). The amendments also clarify
some ambiguity in the notice provision by requiring that the description of the damages suffered 2by the plaintiff be given in reasonable
detail. 1
Tender of Settlement. The amendments declare that any tender, or offer, of settlement is
not admissible as evidence. 22 They also state that
where the amount of the tender of settlement is
the same as, substantially the same as, or more
than the amount of actual damages found by the
trier of fact, the consumer shall recover the
tender of settlement or the actual
lesser of the
damages. 23
Waiver By Consumers. As noted in Section I1,
supra, any waiver of the provisions of the DTPA
has heretofore been contrary to public policy
and unenforceable. The 1989 amendments
carved out a narrow exception to this policy. A
consumer may now waive the provisions of the
DTPA where five conditions are met: (1) the
waiver is set forth as an express provision in a
written contract signed by both the consumer
and the consumer's lawyer; (2) the consumer

was represented by legal counsel during the
transaction; (3) the transaction did not involve
the purchase or lease of a family residence; (4)
the transaction involved consideration in excess
of $500,000; and (5) the consumer was not in a
significantly disparate bargaining position. 24 The
amendments also make clear that waiver is an
affirmative defense, so the defendant must plead
and prove all five of the above conditions.
Moreover, in proving that the consumer was not
in a significantly disparate bargaining position,
evidence of the consumer's financial position
relative to other parties to the contract, or of
written contract clauses stating that the consumer isin an equal bargaining position, are insufficient. 25 The last part of this provision makes it
more difficult for a defendant to win a summary
judgment motion based solely on the defendant's net worth in relation to the consumer, or
on a small print provision in a contract between
the parties that confesses equality of bargaining
positions.
Comparative Responsibility Defenses. Finally,
the 1989 amendments include certain so-called
"tort reform" defenses where the consumer's
claim involves either wrongful death, personal
injury other than mental anguish, or damage to
property other than what was involved in the
consumer transaction. 26 Where the cause of
action involves one or more of these claims, the
amendments provide that the defendant is entitled to allege defenses under the Texas comparative responsibility scheme. 27 Generally, this
allows the defendant to submit to the jury issues
dealing with the plaintiff's responsibility for the
damages. The jury's findings may, depending on
the respective percentages of responsibility
found attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant, deprive the plaintiff of a recovery. This
comparative responsibility scheme isotherwise
2
inapplicable to claims under the DTPA. 8
IV. The Texas Property Code
The Texas Property Code applies to all actions
to recover damages for residential construction
defects "except an action for personal injury,
survival, or wrongful death or for damage to
goods."2 9 Recoverable damages include the cost
of repairing the structure, any residual loss of
value to the home due to the stigma associated
with certain major structural defects, and any
mental anguish suffered by the consumer.30 At
common law, there was no requirement that the
homebuyer afford the builder an opportunity to
repair the defects. Most homebuyers do not
want the builder to perform major repairs be(continued on page 94)
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cause they believe that if the builder did not
properly build the home in the first place then
the builder is incapable of properly repairing
the home.
The recent amendments to the Texas Property
Code dramatically alter the rights of consumers
and contractors. These amendments primarily
impact two areas. First, the amendments provide
new defenses to homebuilders and contractors.
Second, they require homebuyers to give homebuilders notice and an opportunity to repair.
V. The 1989 Amendments to the Texas Property
Code
The 1989 amendments to the Texas Property
Code are set forth in chapter 27 of the Texas
Property Code. Chapter 27 ("the Act") is titled
"Residential Construction Liability."
Defenses to Liability. The Act expressly provides defenses to liability "for damages, or any
percentage of damages, caused by" four specific
matters:31

"(1) negligence of a person other than the
or subconcontractor or an agent, employee,
'32
tractor of the contractor;
"(2) failure of a person other than the contractor or an agent, employee, or subcontractor of
the contractor, to take
reasonable action to mit'33
igate the damages;
"(3) normal wear, tear, or deterioration; or"

34

"(4) normal shrinkage due to drying or settlement of construction components within the
' 3
tolerance of building standards. 5
The term "normal" as used above is not
defined in the Act. It is clear, however, that the
purpose of these provisions of the Act is not to
excuse defective construction. There is nothing
"normal" about a cracked foundation that results from a contractor's failure to take into
account the soil conditions under a house. Similarly, bowed walls could not be considered
"normal" when they result from the use of
improperly cured lumber. Instead, these provisions are intended to protect homebuilders who
use good homebuilding practices and the conditions giving rise to the homebuyer's complaint
exist nonetheless. In addition, these four limitations on liability are not intended to limit other
defenses
that may be applicable to a specific
36
case.
Notice and Opportunity to Repair. Generally,
the Act requires notice sixty days before suit is
filed. 37 Moreover, the contractor must be given
an opportunity to inspect the home for the
days of realleged defects within twenty-one
38
ceiving notice of the lawsuit.

The pre-filing notice letter must specify the
claimed defects in "reasonable detail." 39 The
reasonableness of the detail contained in the
notice letter should be examined in light of the
relative positions of the parties. That is, a homebuilder presumably has levels of skill, knowledge and sophistication with respect to construction that are greater than those of the
ordinary homebuyer. Cracked sheetrock may
raise suspicions of a foundation failure to an
ordinary builder. A homebuyer, however, may
be unaware that cracked sheetrock frequently is
a symptom of serious structural problems. The
adequacy of the pre-filing letter, therefore,
should be tested by determining whether the
information provided is sufficient to put the
builder on notice that defects in construction
exist.
Within thirty-one days after receiving notice,
the prospective defendant may make an offer to
repair or to pay for the repair of the defects in
the home. 40 The offer to repair must specify "in
reasonable detail" the repairs which will be
made.41 The reasonableness of the detail in the
contractor's letter making an offer to repair or to
pay for repairs should be tested by determining
whether sufficient information is presented to
enable a homebuyer, with expert assistance, to
determine whether the repairs will be effective.
If a contractor's offer to repair is accepted, the
repair work must be completed within forty-five
days after the date on which the homebuilder
received the homebuyer's acceptance of the
42
offer to repair.
When a suit is filed before the notice provisions have been satisfied,the defendant may file
a motion asking the court to abate the lawsuit.
Such abatement allows the defendant an opportunity to inspect the home and, should the
defendant choose, to make an offer to repair the
alleged defects.43 If a homebuilder fails to make
an offer to repair, or to properly and timely perform the offered repairs, or if the homebuyer
reasonably rejects an offer to repair, then the
limitations on damages provided by the Act do
not apply.44 If a homebuyer "unreasonably rejects" an offer to repair or to pay for repairs or,
when a settlement offer has been accepted and
the homebuyer subsequently does not permit
the contractor to repair the defects, then the
homebuyer may not recover damages in excess
of the reasonable cost of repairs plus attorneys'
4s
fees incurred before the offer was rejected.
When a contractor makes repairs by satisfying
all of the requirements of the Act, a homebuyer
may not recover any damages, attorneys' fees or

court costs arising from the defects unless the
trier of fact finds that the attempt to repair was
not made in good faith and did not cure the
defects in question. 46 This provision appears to
unjustifiably forfeit the homebuyer's right to
recover damages for any residual loss of value to
the home.
Finally, when the defects in a home create "an
imminent threat to the health or safety of the
inhabitants," the Act requires the contractor to
"take reasonable steps to cure the defect as soon
as practicable." 47 If the contractor fails to respond promptly, the homebuyer may have the
defect cured and recover from the homebuilder
the cost of the repairs, attorneys' fees and court
costs, as well as any other damages
to which the
48
homebuyer may be entitled.
VI. Conclusion
The recent amendments to the DTPA require
consumers to give sixty days notice to prospective defendants and to allow defendants to
inspect the goods or services in question. The
amendments also prohibit any offers of settlement from being presented as evidence to the
jury. Finally, the amendments allow consumers
to waive the protections of the DTPA under certain limited conditions and provide for the
application of "tort reform" defenses under
other limited conditions.
The recent amendments to the Texas Property
Code set forth in the Act substantially alter the
rights of homebuilders and homebuyers. One
significant amendment is the requirement that
the homebuyer permit the homebuilder an
opportunity to cure the defects. Another significant amendment is the disallowance of any recovery of other damages (e.g., damages for
stigma) if the repairs are properly performed.
Only time will tell what effect the amendments
to the DTPA and the Texas Property Code will
have on Texas consumers.
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